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Background !
Between 26 and 29 April 2011 a four-day interdisciplinary workshop “Science meets Law” was 
held at the Lorentz Center (University of Leiden, NL). It was organised by the Lorentz Center in 
collaboration with the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social 
Sciences (“NIAS”, Wassenaar, NL). The programme was prepared by Richard Gill and Johannes F. 
Nijboer and connected to Richard Gill’s 2010-2011 stay at NIAS as Distinguished Lorentz Fellow. !
Hans Nijboer passed away 13 April, 2013; age 61. We miss a good friend and a great scientist. !!!
A Time of Major Change and Challenge for Forensic Science and for the Development of the 
Law !
Forensic science is undergoing a period of fundamental change.  !
In common law countries there have recently been dramatic developments: the imminent 
privatisation of the Forensic Science Service (FSS) in England; authorisation of disciplinary 
hearings against registered forensic experts in the United Kingdom (Meadow v General Medical 
Council, 2006); abolition of the civil immunity of expert witnesses in the United Kingdom (Jones v 
Kaney, 2011); likely changes to the admissibility of opinions in the United States (Amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2011) and the United Kingdom (Law Commission of England and 
Wales, 2011), after major changes to statutory regimes for evidentiary admissibility in Australia and 
New Zealand (see Freckelton, 2009); and new scrutiny upon the way in which expert opinions 
should be expressed to the courts.  !
In Continental criminal justice systems there is also heightened attention for the weaknesses and 
risks of poor quality forensic science. Within the European Union the mutual recognition of 
“products” of investigation, prosecution and adjudication has been given high priority (exchange of 
data from databases on the basis of the Prüm treaty and the subsequent regulation by the European 
Commission, the so-called Swedish framework decision on the accreditation and standardisation in 
the fields of DNA-related and biometric forensic expertise). In Belgium and the Netherlands 
initiatives have been launched for quality improvement and control: see the Belgian report by the 
Hoge Raad voor de Justitie/Conseil Supérieur de la Justice of 30 March 2011, concerning the statute 
and quality of “court experts” (gerechtsdeskundigen) and the Dutch legislation on the position of 
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experts in criminal proceedings (Wet Deskundige in strafzaken, in force 1 January 2010) and the 
related creation of a national register (Nederlands Register Gerechtelijk Deskundigen, NRGD). In 
many countries the discovery of judicial errors (miscarriages of justice), sometimes closely related 
to the involvement of forensic expertise in the case, has given a boost to more intensive attention to 
this aspect of the criminal justice system (De Roos & Nijboer, 2011).    !
These phenomena will have important flow-on effects for the investigation and research carried out 
by and the evidence given by forensic statisticians and other forensic scientists. They provide 
important opportunities for the disciplines to gain enhanced standing and credibility in the courts 
and in the criminal justice system. In theory this pertains for all jurisdictions in which non-legal 
(forensic) expertise plays a significant role, including the activities of special criminal tribunals 
(like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ) and of the International 
Criminal Court. !!
Courts’ Discomfort with Numerate Evidence !
Many (criminal) court decisions have expressed discomfort about the potential for evidence 
expressed in numerate terms to be misconstrued by both judges and juries – this was the basis for 
the preclusion upon the “prosecutors’ fallacy” (see Thompson and Schumann, 1987). In 1997 in 
Doheny and Adams, for instance, the English Court of Appeal strongly endorsed the observation in 
Adams (1992: 482) that:  !
“To introduce Bayes Theorem, or any similar method, into a criminal trial plunges the jury into 
inappropriate and unnecessary realms of theory, and complexity deflecting them from their proper 
task.” 	
!
While the quest for certainty remains (see Vosk, 2010), at least to the point of evaluating whether 
evidence proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the potential of “trial by numbers” remains a source 
of fear for courts in many jurisdictions. !
Four years after Doheny in Australia the then President of the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal (Mason P in R v GK (2001) at [26]–[27]) expressed similar sentiments in emphatic terms: 
The process of assessing the weight of different items of evidence and reasoning to a conclusion on 
the civil or criminal standard cannot be reduced to mathematical formulae. In an article on 
“Probability and Proof in Legal Fact Reasoning" (1995) 69 ALJ 731 at p736, the Hon Mr Justice D 
H Hodgson said that "decision-making generally involves a global assessment of a whole complex 
array of matters which cannot be given individual numerical expression". He warned that 
concentration on mathematical probabilities can prejudice the common sense process which 
depends upon experience of the world and belief as to how people generally behave (see also State 
Government Insurance Commission v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31 at 32-3, Mitchell (1997) 98 A 
Crim R 32 at 37-8, Burger King Corporation v Hungry Jack's Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 at [591]).!!
It is therefore inappropriate to determine guilt by the application of mathematical formulae 
suggesting how to aggregate the impact of different items of evidence. That is why Bayes Theorem 
has been rejected in this area. !
Judicial officers generally have little background in numeracy and have not adapted readily to 
evidence in a quantitative form – both because of a concern that they or, especially, a lay jury, may 
misconstrue it, and because of the risk that it may overwhelm and distort the decision-making 
process in both criminal and civil hearings. As Lord Kerr put it in Sienkiewicz v Grief (UK) Ltd 
(2011: at [2011]):  
There is a real danger that so-called ‘epidemiological evidence’ will carry a false air of authority. It 
is necessary to guard against treating a theory based on assumptions as a workable benchmark 
against which an estimate of the increase in risk could be measured. (see generally Goldberg, 2011) !
In the now notorious decision of R v T (2010; see Redmayne, Roberts, Aitken, and Jackson, 2011), 
part of the difficulty from the perspective of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales was that for 
good reasons, which were clearly explained on appeal, the scientist involved elected not to present 
his opinions in a relative risk ratio or in a numerate form (endeavouring to refrain from any form of 
prosecutor’s fallacy), rather undertaking careful calculations and then expressing his views in a 
qualitative, generalised way (cp R v South, 2011). The anxiety expressed by the Curt of Appeal in 
relation to anything resonant of quantitative analysis is representative of the law’s traditional 
inclination toward decision-making flexibility and qualitative analysis of “all of the evidence” at 
trial and the adoption of an approach of unfettered “intuitive synthesis” of relevant factors at 
sentencing.  !
A difficulty arises too for courts in combining quantitative with qualitative evidence in a rigorous 
way. An aspect of this is the disentanglement of “hard” evidence from “soft”, just as courts have 
bewailed the problems that arise when insufficient distinction is drawn between evidence in the 
form of  “fact” and evidence in the form of “opinion”, as well as in relation to inadequately 
articulated assumptions made on the way to the formation of an opinion (see eg Makita (Australia) 
Pty Ltd v Sprowles, 2001: at [85]; see also Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar, 2011). !
A challenge, therefore, for forensic statisticians arises in relation to how they can shift a culture of 
mistrust and discomfort on the part of judicial officers towards acceptance of the contribution that 
can be made from a quantitative perspective to the decision-making process without overwhelming 
or distorting it. !
At present forensic statisticians world-wide are trying to present their conclusions in qualitative 
terms intended to be suitable for unfettered intuitive synthesis of all of the evidence. There is a 
strong consensus within the professional community that the forensic statistician should report a so-
called likelihood ratio: that is to say, the ratio of the probabilities of the statistical evidence in 
question, under hypotheses appropriate to the two parties in a criminal case: defence and 
prosecution. This does not oblige the court to combine this part of the evidence with other parts in a 
formal application of Bayes’ rule. A likelihood ratio of, say, 2000, can be characterised as “strong 
support for the proposition” according to the “Standards for the formulation of evaluative forensic 
science expert opinion” proposed by the Association of Forensic Science Providers (2009). !
It is very clear that the legal community is still far from understanding adequately the enormous 
difference between proposals that courts should adopt Bayes’ rule and formal probability calculus to 
come to their conclusions, and that courts should be prepared to accept forensic statistical evidence 
presented in the form of likelihood ratios. This is certainly not helped by forensic statisticians’ own 
use of language, which often clouds the distinction. !
On the other hand, it is reasonable that courts should be wary of a false air of authority carried by 
results of quantitative analysis. Likelihood ratios have precise meanings and typically depend on a 
large number of assumptions, some relatively hard but some extremely soft. Here the forensic 
statistical community has a great deal of work to do in developing means to communicate the 
reliability and the domain of validity of a particular analysis.  !
A likelihood ratio is based on a mathematical/probabilistic model and formulation of the problem to 
be considered. This model (or rather pair of models) is a necessarily idealised, hence necessarily 
highly simplified,  description of the situation. The important question, which the statistical expert is 
responsible for answering in discussion with the court, is whether or not it is still adequate for the 
purpose at hand. The model should be as simple as possible, without prejudicing its adequacy, in 
order to be as clearly transparent as possible. Whether or not these conflicting aims (transparency 
and realism) can be satisfied at the same time (i.e., without sacrificing adequacy) can never be a 
prior guaranteed. There are a whole host of issues about sensitivity of model assumptions (e.g. do 
we account for various possible anomalies in measured DNA profiles or not? Which “population” 
do wo use as reference?, etc) which, as statisticians know, can be crucial to conclusions. In fact, part 
of a statistician’s usual work when collaborating with scientists in any applied field, is coming to an 
unfettered intuitive, but definitely expert, synthesis of results of the many component statistical 
analyses which together form one statistical investigation. Subject matter knowledge, and 
knowledge of the purpose of the analysis, cannot be separated from this synthesis. This is no 
different from the way other experts (e.g., medical) do work, and are expected to work, in a 
multidisciplinary context. It is equally reproducible, equally subject to objective discussion and 
criticism. The problem that courts and laypersons have with understanding statistical evidence are 
not essentially from their problems with understanding scientific methodology and thinking in 
general, though of perhaps greater magnitude, due to confusion of language and the frequent (well 
known) failure of layman’s intuition without regard to probability and uncertainty. !!
Miscarriages of Justice Arising in the Context of Statistical Evidence !
Miscarriages of justice arising from issues with expert evidence are a source of grave concern for 
judicial officers, trial lawyers and expert witnesses alike. Their incidence is the subject of ongoing 
debate (see eg Naughton, 2009; Huff and Kilias, 2008; Naughton, 2007; Nobles and Schiff, 2000; 
Walker and Starmer, 1999). Such miscarriages have many explanations, some of them occurring 
because of deliberate withholding of evidence by the prosecution (Spencer, 1997), some because of 
poor quality scientific work, such as contamination of exhibits or unsatisfactory functioning of 
forensic laboratories (see eg Bromwich, 2007; Thompson, 2009; Kelly and Wearne, 1998), some 
because of poor cross-examination that does not expose evidentiary deficiencies (Freckelton 1997), 
and some because of decision-maker misevaluation of scientific data. It can be viewed as an aspect 
of law’s struggle to integrate science and the law (see Dwyer, 2008; Faigman, 2004). Statistical 
evidence has played a role in a number of these cases. !
Trial decisions where it is widely viewed that the wrong result was arrived at, including the Lucia 
de Berk saga in The Netherlands (see Derksen, 2010), in which fundamentally different forms of 
evidence were given in respect of the unlikelihood of a nurse being present at multiple scenes of 
unrelated death, provide an opportunity for professional reflection. While miscarriages of justice are 
tragic for those concerned and corrosive of respect for the integrity of criminal justice, they have the 
potential to provide an impetus for improvement in professional practice and, sometimes, for 
systemic change for the better. However, this depends upon candid identification of the sources of 
error and preparedness to address them. Too often this is not forthcoming in appellate decisions or 
even on scholarly review. !
For those jurisdictions in the Anglo-American tradition that employ evidentiary admissibility 
thresholds, but also for those jurisdictions that depend for sound curial decision-making upon 
rigorous evaluation of evidence, miscarriages of justice should prompt much reflection on the part 
of forensic statisticians. Within the discipline there remains a tension between those who prefer the 
Bayesian paradigm and those who prefer the frequentist. There is no imperative within any 
professional group that it be homogeneous – many professions are riven by much more division of 
approach than forensic statistics. But it is important to acknowledge where fundamental differences 
lie, what gives rise to them and what consequences ensue for the application of different 
approaches. Transparency about such fundamental matters, even though it may be confronting, is 
the mark of maturity in a professional discipline (Malsch & Nijboer, 2005; Nijboer, 2011). !!
Constructive Responses for Forensic Statisticians !
Identification of the parameters of disciplinary competence can encourage practitioners to be 
cognisant of their limitations – when they should respectfully decline to express forensic opinions 
and when they should stipulate qualifications upon views which may be tentative or provisional.  !
Issues for the Likelihood Ratio approach are the assumptions made and what was referred to in 
Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd (2011: at [11]) as “the adequacy of the data”. It is incumbent upon 
practitioners throughout forensic science to be both rigorous in the incorporation and quantification 
of such assumptions and frank about any issues that might bring into question the legitimacy or the 
significance of such assumptions. The appropriateness of the basis of opinions led in part to the 
disinclination of the English Court of Appeal in Doheny & Adams v The Queen (1997) to accept 
Bayesian reasoning and it played some role also in R v T (2010). The key considerations are the 
twin pillars that induce judicial confidence in expert evidence: transparency and accountability. 
But other factors were at play in R v T and also in the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
decision in relation to epidemiology evidence in Sienkiewicz v Grief (UK) Inc. Courts, too have 
wrestled with “coincidence” evidence (see eg Brenner, 2010) and how they should factor into their 
reasoning processes evidence about the relative unlikelihood of unusual events occurring (see eg the 
de Berk case) which may in the individual case be explicable (eg SIDS cases in the one family: see 
R v Clark, 2003; Cannings v The Queen, 2004; R v Matthey, 2007)) but in the aggregate be such as 
to engender extreme levels of concern about the conduct of a defendant and therefore lead to 
prejudiced and flawed processes of reasoning. For the law this is an area of considerable sensitivity, 
whose underlying principles are still being worked through in difficult cases which have high 
personal stakes for the defendants involved. Thus legal theory itself, assisted by philosophical and 
analytical rigour, as well as by forensic statistics, has a role to play in enhancing decision-making 
and reducing the potential for miscarriages of justice. !
It is apparent that forensic statistics evidence enters something of an adverse curial environment in 
many countries and as a discipline must proceed with both circumspection and candour. It has the 
potential to enhance decision-making because of its provision of a reliable language of analysis and 
rigorous principles of reasoning. However, instances where it proceeds on the basis of questionable 
hypotheses or assumptions run the risk of undermining the confidence of the courts (Nijboer, 2008). 
It is trite to observe that the contributions of the discipline to notorious miscarriages of justice have 
detracted from its stature in the forensic domain (Broeders, 2003). What matters most for now is 
how the discipline responds in terms of its articulation of values, methodologies and approaches. !
The future of forensic statistics as a discipline drawn upon and trusted by the courts to  provide 
assistance that is not more prejudicial than probative (see, e.g., United States Federal Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 403  ) depends on both short-term and long-term work by the profession. A 4
substantial contribution has been made by the Royal Statistical Society (Aitken, Roberts and 
Jackson, 2010; see also National Academy of Sciences, 2009), in its publication about the 
contributions able to be made by the discipline. But more is necessary. Clear enunciation of the 
differences of approach within the discipline and the parameters of competence within the 
profession to assist legal decision-making will be important (Meintjes-Van der Walt, 2000) . This 
may be by way of statements of consensus or by way of codes of practice for forensic statisticians. 
Contrasting examples in this regard are the short-form code of the Expert Witnesses Institute 
(Expert Witnesses Institute, 2005), the Second Consultation Draft Codes of Practice and Conduct 
for Forensic Science Providers and Practitioners in the Criminal Justice System by the Forensic 
Science Regulator (Forensic Science Regulator, 2010), and the Code of Ethics of the Australian and 
New Zealand Forensic Science Society (Forensic Science Society, 2011). Such proclamations will 
go a significant way to address conduct such as that of Professor Sir Roy Meadow in the Sally 
Clark trial (see Freckelton, 2007, Freckelton and Selby, 2009) because they will place a clear onus 
upon those who propose to depart in their reports and oral evidence from such methodologies to 
justify their stance. !
The creation of bodies such as a National Institute of Forensic Science, as recommended by the 
National Research Council of the National Academies (2009) in the United States, and as exists in 
Australia (National Institute of Forensic Science, 2011) and in the United Kingdom under another 
name, the Forensic Science Regulator, has the potential also to be constructive in terms of 
enhancing standards of practice in relation to forensic science generally. However, there is much to 
be said for discipline-specific initiatives to clarify professional issues (including those which are or 
may be seen to be internally divisive) and to stipulate expected standards of practice within forensic 
statistics. !
In addition, broadening of the curriculum of law students at undergraduate level to introduce the 
perspectives of the sciences, including forensic statistics, is important, as is the development of 
postgraduate courses that explore such issues in depth.  Continuing provision of ongoing 
professional education to practising lawyers and to judicial officers by respected members of the 
profession of forensic statistics has the potential to desensitise to numeracy phobias, to initiate a 
culture of recognition and potential acceptance of quantitative evidence, and in due course to 
facilitate rigorous and enhanced decision-making and evaluation by advocates and judicial decision-
makers alike.  !!
!  “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 4
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
!
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